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Introduction
To bring the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic 
to an end and begin the process of social, economic and public 
health recovery, international cooperation for the continued 
development and equitable distribution of high-quality 
diagnostics, therapeutics and vaccines is necessary. Although 
critics have rightly pointed out that achieving universal 
coverage and equitable access to these health technologies 
would require reforms to intellectual property rules as well as 
increased global manufacturing capacity,1 in the meantime the 
‘Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator’ (ACT-Accelerator), 
led by the World Health Organization (WHO), is the only 
global multilateral effort designed to ensure the worldwide 
distribution of these products. In this viewpoint, we focus on 
what it would take to fully fund this mechanism and make it 
successful on its own terms.
The ACT-Accelerator was launched by the WHO and its 
partners (including France, the European Commission, and 
the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation) one year ago, on April 
24, 2020. The framework aims to facilitate the development 
and production of COVID-19 diagnostics, therapeutics and 
vaccines, and to ensure affordable and equitable access to these 
resources globally.2 To achieve these goals, it developed four 
pillars: Vaccines, Therapeutics, Diagnostics, and the ‘Health 
Systems Connector’ pillar.3 The Vaccine pillar (COVAX), 
which has been by far the most high-profile element of the 
ACT-Accelerator, aims to provide 2 billion vaccine doses 
globally by the end of 2021. The Therapeutics pillar aims to 
provide 245 million therapeutics for low and middle-income 
countries by mid-2021, and the Diagnostics pillar aims to 
test 500 million cases in low and middle-income countries 
by mid-2021. The Health Systems Connector pillar aims to 
support the other three pillars by improving health systems 
and local community networks in developing countries.
As of September 2020, the ACT-Accelerator framework 
was estimated by the WHO to require a total of US$38 billion 
to achieve its goals across the four pillars.3 However, global 
fundraising efforts to support the ACT-Accelerator had 
only raised US$16.9 billion by March 12, 2021, resulting in 
a significant gap in funds. In this viewpoint, we argue that 
(especially given the inability to agree any meaningful changes 
to the prevailing intellectual property rules), WHO member 
states have a moral and ethical responsibility to at least ensure 
the ACT-Accelerator is fully funded. We argue that, so far, the 
responsibility to mobilise the necessary financial resources 
has been shared disproportionately, with middle-income 
countries in particular having not shouldered their share of 
the burden.
The Human Right to Health and the Responsibility of 
States to Fully Fund the ACT-Accelerator
Human rights are “rights inherent to all human beings, 
regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, 
or any other status.”4 According to the WHO’s Constitution, 
“The enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is 
one of the fundamental rights of every human being without 
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social 
condition.”5 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, adopted in 1966, specified in Article 12.2 that 
one component of the right to health is ‘the right to prevention, 
treatment and control of diseases’6 (p. 8). In its ‘General 
Comment 14’ in 2000, the United Nations’ (UN’) Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) sought 
to more clearly define the normative content of the right to 
health.7 In Paragraph 16, the CESCR focussed on the right 
to treatment and control of diseases. They noted that this 
right, inter alia, required governments to implement disease 
prevention and education programmes, to promote the social 
determinants of good health, and to ensure the availability 
of emergency medical care. Of most direct relevance for the 
current discussion, they stated that “The control of diseases 
refers to States’ individual and joint efforts to, inter alia, make 
available relevant technologies….” According to the CESCR, 
therefore, the ACT-Accelerator’s support for the development 
and distribution of medical technologies, and the health 
system capacities to deliver them, is an essential part of 
realising the right to prevention, treatment and control of 
diseases (and beyond that, the right to health).
Who has the responsibility for the realisation of these rights 
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in practice? Nation-states have traditionally been understood 
as having responsibilities first and foremost to their own 
citizens. Yet General Comment 14 specifically sought to 
assign a collective responsibility on all states in the event of 
a pandemic:
“Given that some diseases are easily transmissible beyond 
the frontiers of a State, the international community 
has a collective responsibility to address this problem. 
The economically developed States parties have a special 
responsibility and interest to assist the poorer developing 
States in this regard” (Paragraph 40).
In addition to these Right to Health-based arguments, 
scholars in International Law (eg, Kavanagh et al8) have 
argued in the case of antiretroviral HIV medicines that 
equitable global access is also demanded by the human right 
to benefit from scientific advances. If so, there seems no 
reason to suppose that such a right does not equally apply to 
diagnostics, vaccines, and treatment for COVID-19. There 
seem, therefore, to be strong rights-based arguments for a 
collective responsibility to deliver on the four pillars of the 
ACT-Accelerator[1].
Given that countries have differential capacities, however, 
there remains a question as to how this collective responsibility 
should be distributed among states (not least financially). As 
one possible way of allocating responsibility, we suggest a 
principle of proportionality under which states should take 
responsibility for funding the global realisation of the right 
to prevention, treatment, and control of COVID-19 through 
funding the ACT-Accelerator in proportion to the size of their 
economies – specifically their share of global gross national 
income (global GNI). This proportionality principle in global 
public goods provisions also exists in other regimes designed 
to manage global public goods coordination, such as in the 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.9,10
Examining Nation-States’ Financial Contributions to the 
ACT-Accelerator
The idea that states have a responsibility to contribute to the 
ACT-Accelerator framework in proportion to their share of 
global GNI provides an illuminating way of benchmarking 
contributions so far. To investigate this, we analysed the 
financial resource commitments of 203 countries (eg, the 
territories recognized as nation-states by the World Bank) 
to the ACT-Accelerator up to March 12, 2021. The data were 
collected from the Economist Intelligence Unit’s COVID-19 
Health Funding Tracker[2].11 These were compared with 
countries’ relative wealth, as measured by the World Bank’s 
2018 global GNI index[3], which calculates countries’ GNI (in 
current US dollars) in 2018[4]. These countries were classified 
by the World Bank into four income groups: high-, upper 
middle-, lower middle- and low-income.12 
Overall, the amount raised for the ACT-Accelerator by 
March 12, 2021 totalled US$16.91 billion – far less than the 
goal of US$38 billion. Non-state donors[5] accounted for 31% 
of the total contributions so far; state donors account for 
69% of funds raised (a total of US$11.67 billion). Out of 203 
countries, 68 countries had committed funds as of 12 March.
When the relative contributions are examined according 
to the World Bank’s four income groups, it is revealed that 
there are significant differences. As Table 1 shows, no income 
group had pledged its ‘share’ of the total required to fully fund 
the ACT-Accelerator as of 12 March. Even the high-income 
group, which unsurprisingly accounts for the largest share of 
state donations by far (a total pledge of US$11.49Bn) has only 








(If Contributions Were 
Proportionate to GNI 
and the ACT-A Was Fully-
Funded)







% US$ (Bn) US$ (Bn) %








High- 68 40 62.87 20.79 11.49 98.49 55.29 -9.30
Upper middle- 56 13 28.79 9.52 0.11 0.90 1.11 -9.41
Lower middle- 50 7 6.91 2.29 0.002 0.02 0.11 -2.28
Low- 29 8 0.50 0.17 0.07 0.59 41.28 -0.10
Total 203 68 99.07d 32.76e 11.67 100 % 35.62f -21.09
Abbreviations: ACT-A, Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator; GNI, gross national income
a As per World Bank classification.12
b The global GNI in 2018 (about US$ 86.3 trillion).
c The total funds that nation-states pledged as of March 12, 2021 (US$ 11.67 billion).
d This column does not total 100% as there are some territories that are not recognised by the World Bank as countries, but nevertheless account for a (small) 
share of Global GNI.
e US$ 32.76 billion = The amount of funds that WHO requested for the ACT-A (US$ 38 billion) minus the contribution of non-state actors (private sector, 
multilateral donors, philanthropists etc) (US$ 5.24 billion as of March 12, 2021). 
f ie, only 35.62% of the US$32.76 Bn required to fully fund the ACT-Accelerator had been pledged by March 12, 2021.
Jung and Rushton
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2021, x(x), 1–4 3
pledged just over 55% of the amount that would constitute its 
full share of just over US$20Bn. Perhaps more surprisingly, 
the low-income group comes in second place, having pledged 
over 41% of its full share. So far, middle-income countries are 
the group that have failed to contribute in line with their share 
of global GNI by the largest margin. Upper middle-income 
countries account for 28.79% of global GNI but only 0.9% of 
contributions to the ACT-Accelerator, which amounts to only 
just over 1% of their share. Lower middle-income countries, 
meanwhile, make up 6.91% of global GNI but only 0.02% of 
contributions so far.
Breaking these categories down reveals further disparities 
in contribution, and a further tranche of countries in the 
‘missing middle:’ namely, the lower parts of the high-income 
group. Although the high-income group have been the biggest 
donors by far, the vast majority of these funds have come from 
the G7 (see Table 2) – and even these have accounted for only 
64% of the G7’s ‘share’ according to their share of global GNI. 
The non-G20 members of the high-income group contributed 
only 10.85% of the total amount pledged so far, despite the 
fact that their GNIs accounted for 12.61% of the global GNI 
of 2018. Several G20 members had not pledged at all as of 12 
March. The non-G7 countries of the G20, contributed even 
less: only 4.72% of contributions compared to their 32.1% 
share of the global GNI. 
Conclusion
Even fully funding the ACT-Accelerator may not be sufficient 
to ensure universal access to vital COVID-19 technologies 
– other interventions and reforms will likely be required. 
However, the shortfall in contributions so far dooms the 
framework to fail even on its own terms. In this commentary, 
we investigated the financial contribution of state donors to 
the ACT-Accelerator so far, in comparison to their economic 
capability measured in GNI in 2018. We found that first, the 
total amount of contributions is much less than the ACT-
Accelerator requested (only 35% of the amount needed as of 
March 12, 2021). Second, most of the contributions came from 
a few of the world’s most economically developed countries 
(ie, the G7). Third, the contributions of non-G7 high-income 
countries and middle-income countries (both upper and 
lower) were much lower in comparison to their economic 
ability, suggesting that (in contrast to the low-income group) 
they have so far failed to shoulder their share of the burden. 
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Table 2. High-income Countries’ Financial Resources Commitments (as of March 12, 2021)





(If Contributions Were 
Proportionate to GNI 
and the ACT-A Was Fully-
Funded)







% US$ (Bn) US$ (Bn) %








High- 68 40 62.87 20.79 11.49 98.49 55.29 -9.30
The G7 groupd 7 7 45.74 15.12 9.70 83.15 64.16 -5.42
The non-G7 
countries of the 
G20e
12 7 32.10 10.61 0.55 4.72 5.19 -10.06
The non-G7 
countries of the 
high-income 
countries
61 33 17.13 5.66 1.79 15.34 31.61 -3.87
The non-G20 
countries of the 
high-income 
Countriesf
58 30 12.61  4.17 1.27 10.85 30.37 -2.90
Abbreviations: ACT-A, Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator; GNI, gross national income; Bn, billion.
a As per World Bank classification.12
b The global GNI in 2018 (about US$ 86.3 trillion).
c The total funds that nation-states pledged as of March 12, 2021 (US$ 11.67 billion).
d  US$ 32.76 billion = The amount of funds that WHO requested for the ACT-A (US$ 38 billion) minus the contribution of non-state actors (private sector, 
multilateral donors, philanthropists etc) (US$ 5.24 billion as of March 12, 2021).
e Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
f These 12 countries are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey (we exclude 
the final G20 member: the EU).
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Endnotes
[1] The idea that governments have a collective responsibility for the realisation 
of human rights is not limited to the Right to Health. Such a responsibility has 
also, for example, been argued for in the case of the rights of refugees. Dowd 
and McAdam,13 for example, argue that the protection and hosting of refugees 
should be a responsibility shared collectively among states, regardless of 
whether they contributed to the cause of the refugee flows in the first place 
[also see 14]. 
[2] The Economist Intelligence Unit’s COVID-19 Health Funding Tracker (https://
covidfunding.eiu.com/) provides independent data on “global, health-related 
funding efforts, from pledge to disbursement.” The tracker divides funding 
into 10 funding streams. In this viewpoint, we utilised the pledge data (it is 
important to note that a significant number of pledges have not yet proceeded 
to disbursement) allocated to the six streams most directly related to the ACT-
Accelerator, namely: ‘ACT-A to be confirmed,’ ‘ACT-Accelerator Vaccines,’ ‘ACT-
Accelerator Therapeutics,’ ‘ACT-Accelerator Diagnostics,’ ‘ACT-Accelerator 
Health systems,’ and ‘WHO Strategic preparedness and response plan.’
[3] In 2018, global GNI amounted to about US$ 86.3 trillion. 
[4] For a few missing data, we utilised the UN’s 2018 GNI index.15 
[5] These non-state donors include multilateral organisations (eg, United Nations 
Children’s Fund), regional institutions (eg, the European Investment Bank), and 
private sector organizations (eg, philanthropic foundations, private companies 
and individuals).
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